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1.  Europe’s current energy situation
1.1. Energy  consumption
Energy consumption in the EU-27 has stagnated over 
recent years. In 2006, according to the latest official data, 
gross inland energy consumption in the EU-27 was 
1 825 Mtoe, while total final energy consumption, which 
excludes deliveries to the energy conversion sector and 
to energy industries themselves, was 1 176 Mtoe.
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The transport sector is the biggest final energy consumer. 
The amount of final energy used by the transport sector 
exceeds the amount used by all other industrial sectors 
taken together. In 2006 transport consumed almost one 
third of final energy, while the other industries and 
households respectively accounted for 28 % and 26 %. 
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1.2. Energy  intensity
Overall, energy intensity in the EU economy (i.e. tons 
of oil equivalent per million euro) improved substantially. 
Progress was mainly achieved through falling energy 
intensity in the industrial sector, while transport and 
services, which also showed a declining trend in energy 
intensity, contributed to a lesser extent.
Moreover, unlike in the other sectors, consumption 
in the transport sector, where fuels are the main inputs, 
continued to increase over the last decade. This trend 
in transport is associated with two factors: the accession 
of new EU Member States with competitive advantages 
in the road haulage sector and the subsequent expansion 
of road transport in these countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Baltic countries). In addition, some other 
Member States also experienced an increase in their 
transport sector, resulting in higher energy consumption 
(Ireland, United Kingdom, Denmark, Greece and Spain).
Energy consumption of the commerce and other 
services sector remained broadly unchanged. Although 
the services sector in both employment and added value 
grew at the strongest rate, consumption was kept stable 
through improved energy efficiency. Since heating and 
cooling comprise a large part of energy consumption in 
these sectors, a shift to new, modern, well-insulated office 
buildings has significantly contributed to this development, 
in particular in the new Member States.
Apart from transport, energy consumption in the industry 
sector as a whole (excluding feedstock and petrochemicals) 
remained fairly stable. Industry restructuring in the 1990s, 
especially in Central and Eastern Europe, helped to prevent 
a rise in energy consumption. Restructuring also led to 
a major change in the energy mix, entailing a switch from 
solids to gas and electricity. 
In the household sector, two opposing developments 
could be observed. A rising number of (smaller) households 
and improved living conditions that entail larger habitable 
space, more comfortable heating, more electric appliances 
and the installation of cooling equipment drove energy 
consump  tion up. On the other hand, new appliances typically 
consume less energy and new dwellings are better insulated. 
Taken together, these two effects tend to cancel each other 
out and household energy consumption over the last decade 
increased only marginally. 
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1.3. Fuel  mix
Oil remains the most intensively used product in the EU’s 
fuel mix. In comparison to the 1990s, the share of oil in gross 
inland consumption has decreased only slightly – down one 
percentage point to 37 %. The gas and nuclear energy share 
during the same period increased by six and two percentage
points accordingly and in 2006 each comprised respectively 
24 % and 14 % of gross inland consumption. The share of 
solid fuels in the same period shrank considerably (by ten 
percentage points) to less than one fifth of the total fuel mix. 
Renewables at the same time gained almost three percentage 
points. Half of this increase was achieved during the years 
2000-2006, reflecting the effectiveness of EU policies aimed 
at reducing CO2 emissions and dependence on imports. 
However, the share of renewables still remains limited 
(7 % of primary energy consumption (1)) and measures have 
been proposed by the European Commission to increase 
this share to 20 % in final energy consumption. 
The current fuel mix varies widely in the EU Member States. 
To a certain degree it depends on the domestic resource/
production pattern: the UK, an important oil and gas 
producer, relies the most on oil and gas; Denmark, where 
indigenous production is dominated by oil, also consumes 
more oil; while countries having resources of solid fuels – 
Poland, Estonia – prefer those in their fuel mix. The share of 
nuclear is considerable in many of the countries that have 
opted for this energy source: France (42 %), Sweden (35 %), 
Lithuania (26 %), Bulgaria (24 %), Slovak Republic (24 %) and 
Belgium (21 %). 
FIGURE 4
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1.4. Import  dependency
The EU-27 is a net energy importer, despite ever improving 
rates of energy intensity. EU’s indigenous energy production 
is depleting. This import dependency is not a problem as 
such but requires appropriate policies.
The EU’s energy production satisfies less than half of its needs, 
with import dependency reaching almost 54 % in 2006. 
Oil comprises the bulk of total EU energy imports (60 %) 
followed by imports of gas (26 %) and solid fuels (13 %). 
The proportion of imported electricity and renewable 
energy is negligible (less than 1 %). 
The European Union in 2006 imported 608 Mtoe of oil. 
Most of the oil imports come from OPEC (38 %) and Russia 
(33 %), while Norway and Kazakhstan respectively provide 
16 % and 5 % of oil imports to the European Union. The EU 
produces less than one fifth of its total oil consumption. 
Looking at the EU as a whole, the situation is better 
in the gas sector, since domestic production (mostly 
taking place in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) 
satisfies about two fifths of consumption needs. Gas is 
mainly imported from four big suppliers: Russia (42 %), 
Norway (24 %), Algeria (18 %) and Nigeria (5 %). 
Sources of coal imports are also less concentrated – the largest 
suppliers are Russia (26 %) and South Africa (25 %), followed 
by Australia (13 %), Colombia (12 %), Indonesia (10 %) and 
the United States (8 %).
Although overall energy import dependency in the EU 
is high and continues to increase, the situation varies 
significantly from country to country. Denmark is the 
sole country which is completely energy independent, 
while for some countries, like Poland and the United 
Kingdom, import dependency ratios are quite low (close 
to 20 %). At the other extreme, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain have import dependency ratios exceeding 80 %, 
while small island countries like Malta and Cyprus (due to 
their geographical situation) along with Luxembourg 
are fully dependent on energy imports. 
The overall picture masks the very high import 
dependency on one supplier for certain countries. Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Ireland, Sweden and 
Finland are completely dependent on one supplier for gas 
imports, while Greece, Hungary, Austria are more than 80 % 
dependent on the same (monopoly) supplier. Moreover, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland are nearly fully 
dependent on one oil supplier (more than 95 %). Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Cyprus are also almost completely 
dependent on a single supplier for coal. 
(1)  8.5 % of renewables in final energy consumption.
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1.5.  Indigenous energy production
The EU’s energy production has been declining, especially 
from 2004 onwards. In 2006, EU indigenous production is 
880 Mtoe, out of which nuclear energy comprises the largest 
share (30 %), followed by solid fuels (22 %), gas (20 %), oil 
(14 %) and renewables (14 %), although
the contribution of the latter is expected to increase 
significantly in the future in line with the ambitious EU 
policy targets. Declining energy production implies that 
the EU’s import dependency will further increase. 
1.6. CO2 intensity
The EU emitted 5 143 Mt of CO2- equivalent in 2006, 7.7 % less 
compared to 1990 levels (2). Following a period of industrial 
restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe at the beginning 
of the 1990s, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions picked up 
again after 2000. 
Energy-related CO2 emissions represented 77 % of the GHG 
emissions in 2006. CO2 intensity, measured as kg CO2 per ton 
of oil equivalent, has been slowly but steadily declining and 
in 2006 fell to 2 498 kg CO2 /toe.
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(2)  Total emissions of all greenhouse gases, expressed in CO2 equivalent, excluding LULUCF (land use, land use change and forestry). 
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Energy industries generated the highest amount of CO2 
emissions (37 %) in 2006, followed by transport (23 %), 
manufacturing industries and construction (15 %), and 
the residential sector (11 %). Between 1990 and 2006 CO2 
emissions from transport increased by 26 %. Transport is the 
only sector that showed an upward trend during this period.
Among the biggest emitters in 2006 were Germany (21 % 
of CO2 emissions), the United Kingdom (13 %), Italy (11 %), 
France (9 %) and Spain (8 %). However, in terms of CO2 intensity, 
which gives an indication of the CO2 content of the fuel mix, 
high levels have been attained in Malta (5 912 kg CO2 /toe), 
Greece (3 882 kg CO2 /toe), Cyprus (3 711 kg CO2 /toe), Poland 
(3 386 kg CO2 /toe), Ireland (3 259 kg CO2 /toe), Estonia 
(3 088 kg CO2 /toe) and Denmark (3 040 kg CO2 /toe).
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2.1. Future  pathways
In formulating the future EU energy policy it is necessary 
to conduct a thorough analysis of possible developments 
in terms of the EU’s energy demand. This chapter examines 
Europe’s future energy demand under two main scenarios. 
Demand in 2020 is projected according to current trends 
and policies (baseline) and in the case of taking action 
(New Energy Policy) to achieve agreed EU targets on climate
change mitigation, namely a reduction of 20 % in greenhouse
gas emissions compared to 1990, along with a 20 % share for 
renewables in the final energy demand by 2020, and to bring 
about a substantial improvement in energy efficiency. 
In the light of these scenarios, overall developments are 
described and their impact on EU energy security and on 
2020 objectives is assessed.
2.  Europe’s future energy demand
(3)  For a description of PRIMES, see Annex 1 or ‘European Energy and Transport – Trends to 2030 – update 2007’
  (European Commission 2008, ISBN 978-92-79-07620-6).
(4)  For detailed macro-economic and policy assumptions, see Annex 1. Detailed macro-economic assumptions are also included 
  in the above publication on Trends to 2030.
(5)  This scenario and the underlying assumption and results are explained in detail in the publication ‘European Energy and Transport – 
  Trends to 2030 – update 2007’ (European Commission 2008, ISBN 978-92-79-07620-6).
(6)  The oil price increased from 60 $/barrel in March 2007 to almost 150 $ in mid July 2008 before falling back to about 90 $ at the time of writing this report.
(7)  This price equates to an oil price of 66 $/barrel in 2008 money and a nominal price of 84 $/barrel in 2020 provided that the ECB reaches its target 
  to keep inflation from now on below 2 % pa.
(8)  This price equates to 109 $/barrel in 2008 money and to nominally 137 $/barrel with future inflation of just under 2 % pa.
BOX 1
Main assumptions underlying the different scenarios
The results of the scenarios used in this document are derived from the PRIMES model run by the National 
Technical University of Athens (E3MLab). PRIMES is a partial equilibrium model of the energy system providing 
projections on energy demand, supply and transformation including power generation capacities up to 2030 (3). 
It is complemented by a series of specialised models and databases. PRIMES ensures that energy demand and 
supply behaviour, energy prices and investments are determined endogenously. The prices for fuel are determined 
exogenously (see below).
Except from the policy assumptions, all other assumptions (technology, economic structure, demographic 
development, etc.) remain unchanged between the Baseline case and the New Policy case. Both scenarios start 
from common projections, notably on economic growth (2.2 % on average up to 2020), based on short-term 
forecasts of the Commission and macro-economic modelling drawing on DG ECFIN work (4).
The Baseline includes current trends and policies as implemented in the Member States up to the end of 2006 (5). 
The New Energy Policy scenario assumes vigorous implementation of new policies to make substantial progress 
on energy efficiency for reaching other energy and climate targets. The 20 % RES and greenhouse gas targets are 
assumptions for the New Energy Policy. It does not include action on non-energy related greenhouse gases, such 
as methane or NO2, or use of the JI/CDM option previously used in the scenarios supporting the climate energy 
package adopted in January 2008. 
In the Baseline scenario, the price of CO2 equals 22€/t. With the New Energy Policy, the carbon price is equal to 41€/t of 
CO2 and is determined endogenously in order to reach the 20 % emission reduction target under moderate energy prices. 
Given the uncertainty concerning crude oil prices (6), both the Baseline and New Energy Policy cases are described 
by giving ranges for 2020 depending on a moderate or high oil price environment. The moderate price environment 
means an oil price of 61$ (2005)/barrel in 2020 (7). The high price environment would have an oil price in 2005 money 
of 100 $/barrel in 2020 (8).
MOE_maquette_EN_081223.indd   Sec1:11 23/12/08   11:06:5512
FIGURE 8
1 500
1 600
1 700
1 800
1 900
2 000
2 100
2005 2010 2015 2020
BASELINE
NEW ENERGY POLICY
Moderate prices Moderateprices
High prices
Moderate prices
High prices
M
t
o
e
GROSS INLAND CONSUMPTION 
Source: PRIMES
In spite of the growth in energy demand, the energy 
intensity improves under the Baseline. With moderate 
oil prices, energy intensity improves by 24 % by 2020. 
These improvements could be as high as 27 %, if high oil 
prices materialise. The energy intensity gains result from 
a structural shift towards more services and less material/
energy intensive production in industry within a healthy 
GDP growth environment. They also result from efficiency 
improvements in all energy activities. The high energy price 
effect triggers additional energy efficiency. Higher energy 
costs are changing investment patterns and behaviour. 
With the New Energy Policy, primary energy consumption 
decreases at a rate of between 0.4 % and 0.5 % pa depending 
on the oil price level. Primary energy demand would represent 
6 %-8 % less compared to the current situation and would fall 
in 2020 to a level of between 1 670 and 1 710 Mtoe. 
After decades of rising energy demand, the EU’s energy 
consumption would decline for the first time as a result 
of policies and measures on energy efficiency, renewables 
and climate change. 
Action on energy efficiency (i.e. the vigorous implementation 
of existing Directives on matters such as building perfor-
mance, Combined Heat and Power, end-use energy efficiency 
and energy services, eco-design of energy using products, 
as well as further policies along the lines of the Action Plan for 
Energy Efficiency (10) could deliver efficiency improvements 
of 34 %-36 % by 2020 depending on the oil price. These 
gains correspond to 13 %-15 % additional energy efficiency 
improvements in 2020 compared to developments under 
a moderate price Baseline. However, energy demand from 
transport would still grow between 4 % and 8% compared 
to the current situation. 
(9)  Both energy efficiency and energy intensity are used here largely as synonyms, although energy efficiency relates to individual processes and energy 
  intensity to the energy system as a whole; the reason for doing so is that energy efficiency is often understood as an overarching policy action 
  related to all sectors of the economy (see objectives on energy efficiency as endorsed by the European Council in March 2007). 
(10)  See Communication from the Commission – Action Plan for Energy Efficiency: realising the potential, COM (2006) 545 final. 
  This Action Plan sets a framework for policies and measures for energy savings. It suggests the implementation of regulatory measures, improvements of 
  the energy transformation, measures for transport, improved financing tools and economic incentives, increased awareness and international partnerships.
2.2. Overall  developments
Changes in primary energy demand, the evolution of 
individual fuel sources and of the EU’s energy production 
give an overview of possible energy futures of the European 
Union. The EU energy situation in 2020 sets the scene for 
political decisions to be made (urgently) today. 
2.2.1.  Primary energy demand 
and energy intensity
Meeting the energy demand is the basic requirement of 
energy security. An analysis of future primary energy demand, 
also known as gross inland consumption, is therefore essential. 
The level of the future demand is influenced by various 
factors, including energy prices. The impact of demand-side 
developments is generally measured by the evolution of 
energy intensity, which refers to the quantity of energy 
necessary to produce one unit of GDP (9). In the context 
of the baseline and the New Energy Policy, energy savings 
equal energy efficiency improvements, as GDP remains 
unchanged between the scenarios. 
Under baseline conditions the primary energy needs in 
2020 continue to grow, compared to the current situation, 
although at a lower rate than in the past. Given current 
trends, the EU’s consumption rises between 5 % and 9 % 
depending on the oil price, with the higher increase in the 
case of moderate oil prices. Gross inland consumption would 
therefore reach in 2020 a level of between 1 900 and 1 970 Mtoe. 
Fuel needed for the transport sector remains the main driver. 
Transport consumption rises by 17 %-21 % by 2020, with the 
lower limit reflecting developments under high oil prices.
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2.2.2. Fuel  mix
The current fuel mix of the European Union is dominated by 
oil, gas and solids which represent about 80 % of the primary 
energy demand. Given current trends and policies with 
moderate oil prices this figure would remain relatively stable 
up to 2020. High oil prices could reduce the share of fossil 
fuels in primary energy demand to 75 % by 2020, while 
the New Energy Policy would further diminish their share 
to 70 %-71 %. 
With current trends and policies continuing, the oil and gas 
share in primary energy consumption is expected to remain 
stable in 2020 at a level comparable to the current one. 
High oil prices would reduce the oil and gas share by four 
percentage points in 2020. With the New Energy Policy 
the figure would be between 55 % and 59 %, with high oil 
prices leading to a stronger decline in the oil and gas share.
Carbon-free and indigenous energy sources (renewables 
and nuclear) in the EU’s fuel mix would amount to 28 %-30 % 
under the New Energy Policy compared with only 21-25% 
under current trends and policies. The share of renewables 
would increase under all scenarios and price circumstances. 
However, this increase would be partly nullified by a falling 
nuclear share as a result of nuclear phase-out decisions and 
closure of nuclear plants considered unsafe in some Member 
States as well as sluggish replacement of existing nuclear 
plants at the end of their lifetime with plants of the same type.
The development of individual energy sources can be 
summarised as follows: 
  Under each scenario, oil remains the most important fuel 
of the EU’s fuel mix in spite of a decreasing share. 
  Following a steady increase due to growing consumption 
for transportation purposes, oil currently provides the 
largest contribution to primary energy, approximately 
37 %. Oil will still be the most important fuel in 2020, 
especially in transport, due to limited substitution 
possibilities. With moderate prices, the share of oil 
decreases in a broadly comparable manner under 
 
the Baseline scenario and the New Energy Policy, i.e. by 1 % 
approximately. With high oil prices, however, the decrease 
is sharper, falling by three percentage points in the Baseline 
and slightly more in the New Energy Policy scenario. 
  The second largest element in the fuel mix of the 
European Union in 2006 is natural gas, which accounts 
for almost one quarter of the mix. This is six percentage 
points more than the share of solid fuels. Natural gas has 
penetrated all sectors, with the exception of transport. 
Since the mid-1990s, a lot of the new investments in 
power generation have gone into combined cycle 
  gas turbines technology (CCGT). Low natural gas prices, 
relatively low capital cost and favourable technology 
characteristics, especially in terms of environmental 
emissions, are the drivers of this development.
  The share of natural gas in primary energy consumption 
is expected to remain high, above 20 %, under both 
scenarios. However, given the current trends and policies 
with moderate fossil fuel prices, the rapid penetration 
of natural gas hitherto experienced is projected to slow 
down. With high oil prices there would be a slight 
decrease in the gas share to 23 % in 2020.
  Under the New Energy Policy with moderate oil prices, 
natural gas is challenged by the massive penetration 
of renewable energy sources. The share of natural gas in 
the EU’s fuel mix decreases to about 23 %. Under high oil 
prices, the share of natural gas drops significantly to 21 % 
compared with similar developments under moderate 
prices and also the present level. In power generation, 
high gas prices strongly affect the cost-effectiveness 
of gas-fired power plants: high gas prices would reduce 
gross electricity generation from gas by 21 % in the 
absence of the new policy approach and would lead 
to a decrease of electricity generation from gas by 25 % 
in 2020 under the New Energy Policy. Thus, as a result 
of the combined effect of the New Energy Policy and 
high oil prices, the natural gas share in the electricity mix 
of the EU is no higher than 17 %. 
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  Primary energy consumption of solid fuels (mainly hard 
coal and lignite) stagnated between 2000 and 2006 at 
around 18 % of the EU’s fuel mix. Solids are mainly used 
in the power generation sector and in some specific 
industrial applications. 
 
  Given current trends and policies with different oil price 
assumptions, solid fuels are projected to exceed their 
current level by 6 %-7 % in 2020 following oil and gas price 
increases and the nuclear phase-out in certain Member 
States. The share of solids in 2020 is expected to remain 
similar to current levels. 
 
  Under the New Energy Policy, coal and lignite consumption 
will be reduced. The share of solids in the EU’s fuel mix falls 
sharply to 13 % in 2020 under moderate oil and gas prices, 
but would reach 15 % in the case of high prices in 2020. 
The share of solids in power generation would substantially 
diminish as a result of implementing the New Energy 
Policy (19 % in 2020) compared to a baseline with moderate 
energy prices (30 % in 2020). The decrease in the share of 
solids in the EU’s fuel mix becomes much more moderate in 
the event of soaring oil and gas prices, which strengthen 
the relative competitiveness of coal.
  The highest growth after the 1990s has been witnessed 
in renewables and they are still projected to rank first in 
terms of growth till 2020. In 2006, their share in the EU’s 
fuel mix is modest and corresponds to roughly 7 % of 
the primary energy demand. 
  However, renewable energy sources (RES) increase their 
share in all scenarios. Given current trends and policies with 
moderate oil prices, the additional energy consumption 
in 2020 will be primarily met by renewables and natural 
gas. Renewables will increase their market share in primary 
energy (11) to 10 % in 2020 (13 % share in final energy). 
Use of RES increases most in power generation, followed 
by transport. There will also be considerable growth in 
heating and cooling of buildings as well as in industrial 
use of biomass/waste. High oil prices, favouring RES 
deployment, would add 1.6 percentage points to the market 
share of RES in 2020. With high oil prices, renewables will 
become the fourth pillar of the EU’s fuel mix. 
 
  Following implementation of the New Energy Policy, 
the share of renewables in primary energy demand will 
increase substantially, reaching 16 % in 2020 (and slightly 
more than 16 % in the event of high prices). Under the 
New Energy Policy, renewables become the third largest 
source in the EU’s fuel mix. 
 
  As a result of political decisions on nuclear phase-out 
and the programmed closure of plants due to safety 
considerations in some Member States, nuclear shows 
a decline in all scenarios compared to current levels. 
In 2020, given current trends and policies with moderate 
oil prices, it will lose three percentage points, accounting 
for 11 % of the primary energy demand. Under high oil 
prices, falling power generation from gas is compensated 
by higher electricity generation from nuclear energy 
(+13 % in 2020), from renewables (+8 % in 2020) and 
from solid fuels (+4 %). Nuclear would then represent 
13 % of the primary energy demand in 2020. 
  Under the New Energy Policy nuclear energy would 
account for 13-14 % of the primary energy demand 
in 2020, displaying a higher share with high oil prices.
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(11)  The RES share is given here in terms of primary energy consumption as it is the case for all other energy sources. 
  The political target for 2020 is about the RES share in final energy consumption, which leads to higher numbers given that 
  final energy demand is only about two thirds of primary energy consumption. For more details see point 2.3.3.
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2.2.3.  Indigenous production, import dependency
Under each scenario, the EU's indigenous energy production 
declines sharply. The EU's oil and gas industry is facing 
declining resources, despite intensive efforts to increase 
the recovery rate in mature fields as well as in newer smaller 
fields. Gas production will decline at a slower pace (between 
3 % and 4 % pa) than oil (about 6 % pa) till 2020 under various 
oil price assumptions and policy measures. Solid fuels 
exploitation (in particular hard coal mining) drops because 
of high extraction costs, local environment issues in the 
proximity of opencast mines and diminishing state aids. 
These figures do not include the long-term potential 
offered by unconventional oil and gas (see chapter 3).
In view of these production trends, net imports of fossil fuels 
(oil, gas and solids taken as a whole) are expected to increase 
except in the case of the New Energy Policy with a high oil 
price. Given current trends and policies, net imports would 
increase between 21 % and 33 %, with the higher increase 
occurring in the event of moderate oil prices. Only under 
the New Energy Policy with oil prices over 100$/barrel do 
net imports of fossil fuels decrease slightly in 2020 compared 
to the current levels as a result of the substantially reduced 
primary energy demand and the doubling of indigenous 
renewable energy production. This decrease is due to 
the combined effect of policy measures and high prices.
If current trends and policies continue, import dependency 
for oil could reach as much as 93 % in 2020. High oil prices 
would only be able to lessen it by about half a percentage 
point in 2020. Even with the implementation of the New 
Energy Policy, oil import dependency is expected to remain 
high (92 %) owing to the lack of alternative fuels, especially 
in the transport sector.
Gas import dependency rises substantially to 77 % in 2020 
under current trends and policies with moderate oil prices, 
due to the strong rise in the primary gas demand (14 %). 
Soaring oil and gas prices, which harm gas competitiveness, 
lead to a 2 percentage point decline in the import dependency 
of natural gas in 2020. This is due to the lower reliance on this 
energy source in power generation. The New Energy Policy 
promotes renewables and reduces the gas share in addition 
to reducing coal consumption in power generation. Thus the 
New Energy Policy would further contribute to decreasing 
gas import dependency. It would stand at between 71 % 
and 73 % in 2020.
Similarly to natural gas, solid fuel supplies will be increasingly 
based on imports, reaching between 57 % and 59 % in 2020 
under a business-as-usual development (up from just under 
40 % today). The implementation of the New Energy Policy, 
and in particular the carbon constraints under the new ETS, 
will reduce the reliance on coal and lignite in the power 
generation sector. This leads to lower import dependency 
by 2020 (49-50 %). With high energy prices, however, the 
decrease in imports of solid fuel is more modest, as coal’s 
relative competitiveness will diminish less quickly. 
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2.3.  Effects on EU energy security and on 2020 objectives
2.3.1. Energy  security 
Energy security is a major objective of the European Union 
to ensure its economic development and the well-being of 
its citizens. In both of the cases examined, the EU becomes 
more dependent on the external world to meet its energy 
demand compared to the present situation. Even in the event 
of a reduction in overall energy demand and with imports 
remaining at today’s level (New Energy Policy and high oil 
prices) import dependency is set to increase.
Currently estimated at more than 54 % of needs, external 
dependency would stabilise around 56 % in 2020 assuming 
the implementation of the New Energy Policy and oil 
prices over 100 US$/barrel in real terms. However, import 
dependency would be higher with moderate oil prices 
(59 % with 61 US $/barrel) and considerably higher under 
a business-as-usual development (between 60 % and 64 % 
depending on the oil price assumption). 
This situation is mainly due to the decline in the indigenous 
production of oil, gas and solids, which is not being sufficiently 
replaced with indigenous sources such as renewables, and, 
in the absence of the New Energy Policy, to the increase in 
energy demand. 
A still slightly increasing import dependency compared 
with the current situation, such as in the New Energy Policy 
case, can mask considerable improvements in the energy 
security situation. The energy savings and diversification 
improvements with more renewables will make the EU 
less vulnerable to the effects of volatile import price 
developments. In any case, the dependency rate in 2020 
with the New Energy Policy would be markedly lower than 
under current trends and policies. 
Diversification of the EU’s energy demand is enhanced 
under the effect of policy measures and/or prices with 
a high penetration of renewable energy sources, although 
the primary energy demand remains in any case strongly 
dominated by the conventional sources. 
2.3.2. Energy  efficiency 
The European Council’s objective of ‘saving 20 % of the EU’s 
energy consumption compared to projections for 2020, as 
estimated by the Commission in its Green Paper on Energy 
Efficiency’ (12) plays a central role in the European Union’s 
energy policy. Energy efficiency is one of the key ways in which 
CO2 emission savings can be realised and the EU’s growing 
dependency on external energy suppliers can be reduced. 
Given current trends and policies, energy intensity gains of 
1.8-2 % pa would result from a structural shift towards more 
services and less material/energy-intensive production in 
industry within a healthy GDP growth environment. It would 
derive from energy efficiency improvements in all energy 
activities. The implementation of the New Energy Policy 
would translate into energy intensity gains of 2.7-2.9 % pa by 
2020. Energy savings would increase between 13 % and 15 % 
in 2020 compared to developments under current trends and 
policies. Energy efficiency gains result to a certain extent from 
policy measures, but high energy prices also have an impact, 
albeit less marked, on the improvement of energy efficiency.
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(12)  European Council of 8/9 March 2007, European Council Action Plan (2007-2009) Energy Policy For Europe (EPE). 
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The objective of 20 % savings in primary energy consumption 
remains a key pillar of the EU’s energy and climate strategy. 
2.3.3. Renewables
The European Union has set the ambitious objective of 
raising the share of renewable energy sources in its final 
energy consumption from around 8.5 % in 2005 to 20 % in 
2020. This is a necessary contribution to the fight against 
climate change and the effort to diversify our energy mix.
Penetration of renewable energy sources is driven by two 
major forces: the New Energy Policy and, potentially, high oil 
prices. Both favour RES deployment. 
Given current trends and policies renewables would 
represent 13 % of the final energy demand in 2020. Even 
with high oil prices, pushing higher RES deployment, 
renewable energy sources would not break through 
a limit of 15 % in final energy demand. 
Implementation of the New Energy Policy will result in 20 % 
for renewable energy sources in final energy consumption. 
High energy prices could add an additional percentage point 
to the share of renewables in final energy consumption 
by 2020. 
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2.3.4. CO2 and greenhouse gases
In 2007, the Spring European Council set one binding target 
related to greenhouse gas emissions, including CO2 , namely 
that by 2020 a reduction of at least 20 % in GHG emissions 
compared to the 1990 level ought to be reached in order to 
enhance the sustainable development of the European Union.
Given current policies and trends, irrespective of the level of 
energy prices, the 20 % target will not be met in 2020. With 
moderate oil prices, energy-related CO2 emissions are set to 
rise by 5 % between 1990 and 2020 – back on an ascending 
path, after earlier reductions due to restructuring in the EU-12. 
Transport is responsible for more than 50  % of the additional 
CO2 emissions till 2020. GHG emissions would decline by 
1.5 % between 1990 and 2020, due to the reduction in 
non-CO2 GHG emissions.
Transport accounts for a steadily increasing share of energy-
related CO2 emissions under current policies and moderate 
fuel import prices, reaching 29 % in 2020 compared to 27 % 
in 2005 and 20 % in 1990. After 2005, the share of the power 
sector and of industry in energy-related CO2 emissions 
remains relatively stable, while that of the residential sector 
declines by one percentage point over the period to 2020.
With high oil prices, energy-related CO2 emissions could 
stabilise at slightly below the 1990 level (-2 %), due to 
greater RES deployment and the higher share of nuclear 
in the energy mix compared to the moderate Baseline 
developments. GHG emissions would be 7 % less in 2020 
than in 1990.
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Implementing the New Energy Policy and with moderate oil 
prices, energy-related emissions could be 20 % below their 
1990 level. This reflects the EU’s unilateral commitment to 
the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Achieving a 20 % 
cut in energy-related emissions solely on the basis of energy 
policy measures is also compatible with a minus 30 % GHG 
reduction target. For such an objective, action in relation 
to non-energy-related CO2 and non-CO2 gases as well as 
greater recourse to JI/CDM credits is needed. The CO2 price 
required to achieve the 20 % reduction in energy-related 
CO2 emissions would be €41 per ton of CO2 in 2020, which is 
lower than would be the case if no renewables policies were 
put in place. With high oil prices and a CO2 price equal to €41 
per ton of CO2, energy-related CO2 emissions could be almost 
23 % below their 1990 level. This price is consistent with 
the one that would emerge from the ‘cost efficient scenario’ 
analysed in the Impact Assessment for the January 2008 
climate and energy package, which does not include JI/CDM 
credits. It is however important to bear in mind that the 
main scenario considered in the January 2008 Commission 
proposal, a policy case which achieves the CO2 and renewables 
objectives while allowing trade in JI/CDM credits, would 
result in a lower carbon price of about 30€ per ton CO2 
while achieving less energy intensity improvements and 
CO2 reduction.
Implementing the energy and climate policy proposals 
would thus help the EU in delivering on its international 
commitments. It would also improve the environment and 
diversity of the fuel mix while fostering EU competitiveness 
through industrial leadership on efficient low carbon 
technologies. 
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3.1.  Diverging definitions, yet common trends: Europe’s resources are declining
3.  Europe’s indigenous sources of oil, gas, coal & uranium
Compared to a ‘do nothing’ approach, Europe’s energy 
demand will decrease if the New Energy Policy is vigorously 
implemented. There will also be less reliance on fossil fuels in 
2020 than today (13) . However, Europe’s energy security will 
continue to strongly depend on the availability of primary 
energy sources. In the current EU energy mix, oil, gas, coal and 
uranium are the major primary energy sources and they will 
represent a significant part of the future energy mix of the EU. 
Europe has always relied on external supply of energy 
sources to meet its demand and it will continue to do so. 
Currently estimated at more than 54 % of its needs, this 
external dependency is expected to increase up to 56 % in 
2020, when oil prices over 100 US$/barrel (in 2005 money) 
are assumed in combination with the implementation of 
Europe’s New Energy Policy. Import dependency would 
be a bit higher (e.g. 59 % in 2020) with more moderate oil 
prices (e.g. 61 US $/barrel) as fossil fuel demand would be 
higher. This dependency is not a problem in itself. However, 
it requires an active energy security policy, building up internal 
strengths through a well-functioning internal energy with 
good interconnections, diversity in the types of energy used, 
clear regulation for security of supply and mechanisms for 
cooperation to deal with crises. It requires also an effective 
external action aimed at diversification of suppliers and 
supply routes as well as closer cooperation with producers 
and consumers. In view of the predicted growth of world 
energy demand, competition for resources will get tougher 
and the market power of the few large energy exporters 
will increase further.
It is difficult to specify how much gas, oil, coal and uranium 
still exists in the Earth’s mantle and how much can be extracted 
in the future. A wide variety of methodologies is used for the 
assessment and classification of resources and data on fossil 
fuel resources represents sensitive information due to the 
geopolitical, economic and environmental factors influencing 
exploration and extraction activities. However, an overview of 
the resources’ and reserves’ situation for the European Union/
European Economic Area (EU/EEA), compared with the 
information for the world as a whole, sets the scene for 
an energy supply security policy. 
Two trends are evident:
(1) Indigenous resources and the resulting reserves in the 
EU/EEA are declining.
(2) The world’s resources/reserves, still relatively abundant, 
are getting concentrated in the hands of a small number 
of countries.
BOX 2
Resources and Reserves lack common definitions
There is no common standard for defining and therefore assessing resources and reserves at world level and even 
at EEA level because the majority of producing countries tend to use differing national classifications. There are 
also private entities that publish data on commercially exploitable reserves, which do not necessarily correspond 
to national or international classifications. Among the entities publishing information on resources and reserves 
are WEC (World Energy Council), OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries), BGR (Federal Institute 
for Geosciences and Natural Resources, Germany), BP (British Petroleum p.l.c), and the Oil and Gas Journal.
  For the purposes of this document, resources refer to the amount of oil, gas or coal that may be present in 
deposits or accumulations discovered but not exploitable under the present technological and economic 
conditions, and those not discovered yet.
  Reserves refer to portions of oil, gas or coal in place claimed to be recoverable under current economic 
constraints and available technology.
In the context of oil, reserves are often sub-classified as proved, probable and possible:
  Proved Reserves are ‘Reasonably Certain reserves’ to be produced using current technology at current prices, 
with current commercial terms and government consent. They are also known in the industry as 1P. Some industry 
specialists refer to this as P90, i.e. ideally having a 90 % certainty of being produced. 
  Probable Reserves are ‘Reasonably Probable reserves’ to be produced using current or likely technology at current 
prices, with current commercial terms and government consent. Some industry specialists refer to this as P50, i.e. 
ideally having a 50 % certainty of being produced. This is also known in the industry as 2P or Proved plus probable.
  Possible Reserves are reserves ‘having a chance of being developed under favourable circumstances’. Some 
industry specialists refer to this as P10, i.e. ideally having a 10 % certainty of being produced in the foreseeable 
future. This is also known in the industry as 3P or Proved plus probable plus possible.
The bulk of these definitions apply mutatis mutandis to gas and coal.
(13)  See New Energy Policy scenario, Annex 2.

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For uranium, specific categories have been established at international level (14). Undiscovered resources refer to 
expected resources based on geological knowledge of discovered deposits and regional geological mapping. 
Identified resources are close to reserves since they are recoverable. They are, however, subdivided by cost ranges 
and the most used category is ‘Identified Resources recoverable at a cost of less than USD 130/kgU’. 
The relations between resources and reserves in the context of oil may be illustrated in the following way (not to scale):
  Unconventional oil and gas can be exploited with improved technologies and moderately higher prices. 
It is generally accepted that unconventional oil includes heavy oil, extra heavy oil and bitumen (or tar sands) 
whereas unconventional gas covers coal bed methane, low quality and/or stranded gas, ultra-tight gas 
formations, Devonian shale gas, very deep gas and methane hydrates.
  The Reserve-to-production ratio (R/P) indicates the length of time (years) that the remaining reserves would 
last if production were to continue at the rate of production of a given year. Such a ratio is obtained by 
dividing the reserves remaining at the end of any year by the production in that year.
This ratio must not be confused with the time span until depletion of the resources or end of production, 
as recovery can be enhanced through additional efforts or as new discoveries are made over time.
In some instances, a reserve-to-consumption ratio is used. It indicates the length of time the remaining 
reserves would meet the current consumption requirements.
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(14)  See OECD/International Atomic Energy Agency, ‘Uranium 2007: Resources, production and demand’.
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3.2.  Reserves and resources found in the European Union/European Economic Area 
3.2.1. Oil
The EEA is currently an important oil producer ranking fourth 
in terms of global production, even though oil production 
has been declining since 2000 from 6.8 Mbl per day in 2000 
to approximately 5 Mbl per day in 2007. However, the oil 
resources and reserves in the EEA are limited and represent 
a small proportion of world reserves. 
As reported by different sources such as BGR and BP (15), 
the proved reserves of oil in 2006 for the EU range between 
6.9 and 9.7 Bbl and for the EEA between 15.1 and 17.3 Bbl 
(see figure 14). At the end of 2007, according to BP, the proved 
reserves for the EU amount to 6.7 Bbl, whereas the corres-
ponding figure for the EEA is 14.9 Bbl.
These reserves are mainly located in the North Sea area 
(Norway, United Kingdom and Denmark) and in South-East 
Europe (Romania). 
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(15)  BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2008, hereafter ‘BP’.
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The proved reserves for the EU represent between 0.5 % 
(BP 2007) and 0.8 % (BGR 2006) of world reserves. The 
different graphs below show a convergence of estimates  
and a relatively moderate declining trend in respect of 
current reserves (see figure 15). At the current production rate, 
these proved reserves secure between 7.7 (Enerdata 2008) 
and 7.8 (BP 2008) years of domestic production. 
Figures for the EEA also show a declining trend, with 
reserves falling even faster/steeper. These EEA proved 
reserves represent between 1.2 % (BP) and 1.5 % (BGR) of 
world reserves. At current rates, the EEA proved reserves 
secure between 8 (derived from Enerdata data 2008) and 
8.3 (derived from BP figures) years of domestic production.
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According to OGP, the EEA resources for oil at the end of 2006 
could amount to some 26-27 billion of boe. In the light of 
BGR’s estimates for the resources and reserves of crude oil 
in the EU/EEA, the production potential still seems 
considerable. 
Resources are more limited for the EU than for the EEA 
(see figure 16). However, the remaining resources are concentrated 
in smaller accumulations and fields. Production in these fields 
will depend on favourable economic circumstances and 
improvement in oil recovery technologies. 
Unconventional oil also offers additional potential (see 
figure 21). For the EU-25, according to BGR, it could represent 
more than 25 % of the conventional reserves and more than 
60 % of the conventional resources. For the EEA, it could 
represent up to 40 % of the conventional reserves and more 
than 55 % of the crude oil conventional resources.
3.2.2. Gas
The gas reserves and resources in the EU/EEA represent 
a very modest share of world reserves, even if the picture 
looks better for gas than for oil. As reported by different 
sources such as the Oil and Gas Journal, BGR or Enerdata, 
the proved reserves range between 2 700 Bcm (O&GJ) and 
3 500 Bcm (BGR) for the EU. They ranged between 5 000 Bcm 
(O&GJ) and 6 200 Bcm (Enerdata) for the EEA at the end of 
2006 (see figure 17). 
The proved reserves for the EU correspond to 1.4 % 
(WEC 2005), or 2.0 % according to BGR, of the world’s 
proved reserves. EEA gas proved reserves amounted to 
approximately 2.7 % (WEC 2005), or 3.7 % according to ENI 
2007, of the world’s proved reserves at the end of 2005 
(see figure 18).
As demonstrated by the illustrations, there is a convergence 
of estimates showing a declining trend for proved reserves 
of natural gas for the EU/EEA. The decline appears to be 
somewhat faster for the EEA than for the EU. 
Gas reserves are mainly located in Norway, the Netherlands, 
the United Kingdom and Romania.
At current production rates, the EU proved reserves secure 
between 14.4 (Enerdata) and 14.8 (BP) years of domestic 
production (BP). For the EEA, the proved reserves secure 
between 19.4 (derived from Enerdata figures) and 19.9 
(derived from BP figures) years of domestic production.
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Some estimates show that natural gas resources may 
remain significant at an EU/EEA level. According to BGR, 
the estimated resources for the EU are around 50 % less 
than for the EEA. On the whole, resources of natural gas for 
the EEA could amount to approximately 7 000 Bcm, which 
more than doubles the current proved reserves (see figure 19). 
These conventional natural gas resources could be augmented 
by unconventional resources. The unconventional resource 
potential is not negligible (see box 3). This potential will 
however be more difficult to exploit, in view of enhanced 
recovery techniques needed and the increasing share of 
sour gas to be encountered, posing safety issues.
BOX 3
Europe’s remaining potential for gas and oil
Reserves and resources of crude oil and natural gas in the EU/EEA represent a modest share of world reserves 
and resources. The EEA almost doubles the oil reserves and resources of the EU (see figure 20). 
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FIGURE 20: RESERVES AND RESOURCES  WORLD SHARE OF EU AND EEA BY THE END OF 2006
Source: BGR, calculations from the JRC
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FIGURE 21: CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL RESERVES AND RESOURCES OF CRUDE OIL 
AND NATURAL GAS , 2006
Source: BGR, calculations from the JRC
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3.2.3. Coal
About 80 % of Europe’s fossil fuel reserves are solid fuel 
(including coal and lignite). Proved reserves of coal and 
lignite may be considered as substantial, although they 
represent only a limited share of world reserves. 
As reported by the World Energy Council, the coal proved 
reserves in the EU at the end of 2005 are estimated at about 
8.5 Bt of hard coal and about 21 Bt of lignite (including 
sub-bituminous coal). On the whole, these proved reserves 
amount to about 29.5 Bt. According to BGR, which uses 
different classifications, reserves amount to 19 Bt of hard coal 
and 75 Bt of brown coal and lignite at the end of 2006.  
(see figure 22).
In BP’s view, the EU’s proved reserves represent 3.5 % of world 
reserves and 50 years of today’s production.
Proved reserves for hard coal are mainly concentrated in 
Poland, with significant reserves in Czech Republic and to 
a more limited extent in Spain, Hungary, UK and Germany. 
For lignite, reserves are present in a group of countries 
extending from Germany to Greece.
Coal resources are reported to correspond to 476 Bt for hard coal 
and 83 Bt for brown coal and lignite at the end of 2006 (BGR). 
The WEC, using different classifications, estimates these resources 
at around 24.5 Bt for hard coal and 31 Bt for lignite (including 
sub-bituminous coal) at the end of 2005 (see figure 22).
3.2.4. Uranium
Identified resources of uranium (<USD 130/kgU) in the 
EU are very modest and unevenly distributed. As reported 
by OECD and IAEA (16), they amount to approximately 
105 500 tonnes U and represent 1.9 % of world identified 
resources as of 1 January 2007. Denmark holds the biggest 
identified resources with 32 300 tonnes U while France, 
Spain and Sweden have identified resources above 
10 000 tonnes U.
It has to be noted that EU indigenous sources are substantially 
complemented by reprocessed and re-enriched sources. 
The situation for 2007 is presented in figure 23.
Only a few countries have reported their estimates on 
undiscovered resources. On the basis of the available 
information, undiscovered resources in the EU could 
represent 1.1 % of the world’s undiscovered uranium 
resources. Undiscovered resources are thought to be 
present in Denmark and Hungary.
FIGURE 22
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Source: Euratom Supply Agency
(16)   See OECD/International Atomic Energy Agency, ‘Uranium 2007: Resources, production and demand’, 2008.
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(17)  A moderated high oil price is necessary for unconventional oil to be exploited under good economic conditions.
(18)  New technologies are required.
(19)  Environmental impacts related to their exploitation are significant. Site regeneration takes time for example.
3.3.  World reserves and resources 
3.3.1. Oil
The world’s proved reserves of oil have increased at an 
average annual rate of 2.4 % since the beginning of the 
1980s. According to BP, they increased from around 
910 Bbl in 1987 to around 1 238 Bbl at the end of 2007. 
The situation at the end of 2007, however, shows a decline 
in proved reserves for BP. At the end of 2006, the proved 
reserves amount to 1 239.5 Bbl. Enerdata considers that 
the world’s proved reserves amount to 1 339 Bbl in 2007 
and are higher than the reserves at the end of 2006, 
which were 1 332.5 Bbl. In this case, no decline in world 
reserves is observed.
Over two thirds of oil reserves are concentrated in the Middle 
East (61 %) and Russia (6.4 %). South and Central America and 
Africa account for 18.5 % of the proved reserves. Reserves 
tend to be concentrated in a small number of countries. 
Thirteen countries have individual proved reserves above 2 % 
of the world’s proved reserves. Only seven of these countries 
have individual proved reserves above 5 % according to BP. 
Apart from Venezuela and Russia, these countries belong 
exclusively to the Middle East (Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, UAE and, 
with 21.3 %, Saudi Arabia).
BP considers that the world’s proved oil reserves amount to 
41.6 years of current production. The reserves-to-production 
ratio for the Middle East is much higher: 82.2 years. It is  
21.8 years for Russia. Enerdata estimates the world’s proved 
reserves at 47.4 years of current production. 
Conventional oil resources have been estimated at 82 Bt 
at the end of 2006 by the BGR, which in this case covers 
the resources that are proved but not economically 
recoverable at present or are recoverable amounts of 
geologically indicated resources. The US Geological  
Survey estimates that about 140 Bt of recoverable 
conventional oil could be discovered.
Unconventional oil is also believed to offer considerable 
potential under favourable economic (17) , technological (18) 
and environmental (19) conditions. Around 600 Bbl (IFP) 
could be recovered, which is comparable to the Middle 
East’s proved reserves (755.5 Bbl according to BP). This 
unconventional potential is mainly located in the Americas 
(the extra heavy oil from Venezuela and the oil sands from 
Canada). With 175 Bbl in oil sands reserves, Canada ranks 
second in global oil reserves. 
3.3.2. Gas 
The world’s proved reserves of natural gas have constantly 
increased since 1980 at an average annual rate of 3.4 % 
and the volume of proved natural gas reserves has more 
than doubled over that period (WEC). The world’s proved 
reserves have increased from approximately 70 Tcm since 
1987 to 177 Tcm in 2007 (BP). They amount to about 
181 Tcm at the end of 2006 (BGR) and to about 182 Tcm 
in 2007 (Enerdata). This increase in world reserves results 
both from new discoveries and to a greater extent from 
new assessments of existing fields in the Middle East, 
Asia/Oceania and Africa. 
The world’s proved reserves represent between 
59.8 (Enerdata) and 60.3 (BP) years of production. 
Almost half of the reserves are concentrated in a limited 
number of super giant fields (WEC 2007). Almost two thirds 
of the new discoveries have been made offshore. Offshore 
reserves represent about 70 Tcm.
According to BP, around 41 % of the world’s proved reserves 
are located in the Middle East. The former Soviet Union 
accounts for more than 30 % of the total at the end of 2007. 
Oceania and Africa represent around 16 % (8 % each). 
Gas reserves tend to be concentrated in a small number 
of countries. Only seven countries have individual proved 
reserves above 2 % of the world’s proved reserves and, 
according to EIA, Russia, Iran and Qatar together hold 
about 58 % of the world’s oil reserves (International Energy 
outlook 2007).
Natural gas resources appear to be very substantial. BGR’s 
estimate is that global resources of conventional natural 
gas stand at about 207 Tcm. Some estimates consider that 
the prospects for yet-to-find natural gas could expand 
the lifetime of natural gas up to 130 years at the current 
rate of consumption (WEC). 
Unconventional resources are considered to represent 
a potential ranging from about 13 500 to 25 000 Tcm. 
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3.3.3. Coal
World coal reserves are much more abundant than gas 
and oil reserves. Proved coal reserves have been estimated 
at between 847 Bt (WEC 2005) and 1 019 Bt (BGR 2006). 
At current production levels, proved reserves are estimated 
to last between 133 (BP using WEC figures) and about 
150 (WEC 2007) years. 
Contrary to oil and gas, coal reserves are widely available, 
in almost every country, with recoverable reserves in around 
70 countries. Overall, Northern America, CIS and Asia/Oceania 
have an equal share of reserves, ranging from 27 % to 30 % 
of total reserves. 
More than 80 % of the world’s coal reserves are 
nevertheless concentrated in six countries: 
 USA  (28.6  %); 
 Russia  (18.5  %); 
 China  (13.5  %); 
 Australia  (9  %); 
 India  (6.7  %); 
  South Africa (5.7 %).
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2008
World coal resources could amount to 8 818 Bt of hard coal 
and 3 075 Bt of lignite (BGR).
3.3.4. Uranium
Identified world resources of uranium (<USD 130/kgU) 
are around 5.5 million tonnes U. At the current rate of 
consumption, these resources correspond to about 
100 years of supply (OECD/IAEA).
These identified resources are widely distributed 
throughout the world. Uranium resources have 
been identified in the following countries:
 Australia  (23  %); 
 Kazakhstan  (15  %);
 Russia  (10  %);
  South Africa (8 %);
 Canada  (8  %);
  United States (6 %); 
 Niger  (5  %); 
  Namibia (5 %); and 
 Brazil  (5  %). 
Source: OECD/IAEA, 2008
The undiscovered resources thought to be present 
in the world are estimated at 10.5 million tonnes U. 
MOE_maquette_EN_081223.indd   Sec1:29 23/12/08   11:06:5630
FIGURE 24
PROVED RESERVES OF FOSSIL FUELS IN 2006 (upper and lower estimates defined by shading)
Source: Eurogeographic for the administrative boundaries
  EC-JRC institute for energy – August 2008
3.4  Europe’s fossil fuel map
An overview of Europe’s indigenous fossil fuel reserves is presented in figure 24.
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4.  Europe’s current and future electricity generation    
  capacity: challenges and opportunities
Electricity plays a crucial role in the economic and social 
development of the European Union and in the quality 
of life of its citizens and consumers. It is a key sector for the 
EU economy and constitutes an essential component of 
EU energy security. A sufficient power generation capacity 
and infrastructure – and more generally power generation 
adequacy – are therefore a constant concern, along with 
transmission and distribution networks. This issue is all the 
more sensitive in that electricity is consumed at the time 
it is produced and demand has to be met all the time. 
Deregulation and liberalisation have profoundly changed 
the landscape of power generation, enhancing the role 
of private actors. Changing supply conditions and the 
regulatory framework directly impact on power generation. 
Oil, gas and coal supply prices as well as the price for CO2 
allowances have a major impact on the future development 
of Europe’s power generation infrastructure. As a result of the 
regulatory framework having evolved at EU level, electricity 
has become predominantly commercial and the market 
players have made the needed investments. On the other 
hand, energy security is a public good and public authorities 
bear a responsibility for a market design that is conducive 
to ensuring that sufficient power will be on offer in order 
to meet future demand. In other words, private actors will 
make the necessary investments but public authorities are
ultimately responsible for a market design that fosters energy 
security and encourages investment.
Against this background, power generation in the EU faces 
challenges and brings opportunities at the same time. 
Europe’s electricity generation capacity is at a crossroads (4.1) 
and the way forward has to be sketched out (4.2).
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4.1.  Europe’s electricity generation capacity at a crossroads 
The EU must deal with two major challenges to ensure 
that its generation capacity is adequate in the future: 
(i) promoting clean generation and making capacities available 
on time to produce enough electricity at affordable prices; 
and (ii) ensuring reliability with a view to greater diversity of 
input fuels. Equally, these challenges have to be considered 
as opportunities to revamp the EU’s generation capacity 
in a way that improves its economic and environmental 
performance and provides greater reliability.
4.1.1.  Need for clean generation 
and new capacities
Europe’s New Energy Policy context imposes a major shift in 
the power generation infrastructure. CO2 and GHG emissions 
have to be reduced and these objectives have a direct impact 
on generation capacity, given the share of power generation 
in CO2 emissions (see figure 25).
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The current situation is mainly due to coal-fired generation, 
which represents the largest share of emissions from the 
power sector as well as the second biggest share of installed 
capacities in the EU (see figures 34, 35). As a result of the 
new environmental requirements (including ETS and IPPC), 
the decommissioning phase of installed capacities could be 
accelerated, necessitating replacement of capacities to keep 
generation at a sufficient level to meet demand.
The price of carbon emissions (ETS allowances) and the 
relative costs of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and 
other low-carbon technologies will thus be among the 
major parameters to be factored into investment decisions 
for new capacities together with the security of supply of the 
primary energy needed. Most of the coal-fired replacement 
capacity till 2020 would be in capture-ready facilities, that is 
to say plants which could be retrofitted when CCS becomes 
commercially viable, probably after 2020.
Given current trends and policies, final electricity demand 
is expected to increase over the period to 2030, requiring 
additional generation capacities (see figure 26). So far, at 
EU level, generation capacity has kept pace with steadily 
growing demand. For the existing generation park this 
means that power capacity has risen from 681 GW in 2000 
to 740 GW in 2005, i.e an increase of approximately 60 GW 
or 12 GW on an annual basis, which represents an average 
rate of growth of 1.7 % (see also figure 30). Over the same 
period, electricity consumption has grown at an average 
annual rate of 1.8 %.
Under the baseline scenario, the EU would need a net power 
capacity in the year 2020 which is, depending on the oil 
prices, about 160 or 200 GW higher than today. Under the 
New Energy Policy scenario, the net power capacity in the 
year 2020 would be higher than today by about 150 GW, 
with moderate oil prices, and 180 GW with higher prices. 
In addition to creating this amount of extra capacity, it will 
be necessary to replace existing installations: power plants 
are ageing all across the EU. A substantial part of the current 
nuclear and coal capacity came on stream between 1980 
and 1985, and even before then. Decommissioning should 
take place by 2020 or 2025, under the assumption that coal 
infrastructure operates over an average period of 40 years (20) 
(see figures 27, 28).
FIGURE 26
FINAL ELECTRICITY DEMAND FOR EU27
2005 Baseline scenario 2020 New Energy Policy 2020
Oil price 61$/bbl  100$/bbl 61$/bbl  100$/bbl
Final electricity demand (TWh) 2 762 3 525 3 509 2 990 3 028
Source: PRIMES
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(20)  Which explains the significant replacement of coal fired installations during the 2011-15 period (33 GW) as shown in figure 39.
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The recent deregulation phase of the electricity markets has 
been characterised by optimisation of the use of existing 
infrastructure and a tendency to delay decommissioning 
(see figure 29). Demand has thus been partly met by better 
use of the existing capacities, which also means that further 
decommissioning could be expected.
New generation capacities are necessary both to replace 
existing ageing capacities whose lifetime will soon come 
to an end and to expand capacities to meet future demand. 
Overall, capacity expansion covering both replacement of 
existing capacities and building of new capacities amounts 
to 360 GW until 2020 (New Energy Policy case), which is 
somewhat less than under current trends and policies.
FIGURE 28
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FIGURE 30
ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION CAPACITY BY FUEL IN THE EU IN 2007 GW
Source: Platts
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On the supply side, remaining capacities seem sufficient in 
the short and, for certain parts of the EU, medium term to 
meet the demand (21) . However, without new capacities 
coming on stream, disruptions may occur at EU level from 
2015 onwards and even earlier in some parts of the EU (22), 
in particular for central Europe (CZ, HU, PL, SK) and 
Baltic countries (23) , notably as a result of the planned 
decommissioning of nuclear power plants.
4.1.2.  Need for reliable, flexible and diverse 
generation mix
Power generation infrastructure has to be flexible enough 
to withstand possible supply shocks. Generation adequacy 
is generally measured on the basis of margins of installed 
capacities (incl. a margin for capacity unavailable because 
of maintenance/repair or specific meteorological conditions) 
over peak load, i.e the highest expected level of demand 
currently and in the future. These margins are known as 
reserve or capacity margins and represent the extra supply 
capacity available to respond to unexpected events (extreme 
weather, unplanned shutdowns) while maintaining sufficient 
operating margins (24) . They have been considered acceptable 
when ranging between 18 % and 25 % of the total generating 
capacities, and 15 % seems to be accepted as the bare 
minimum nowadays. With such margins, sufficient power 
can be generated and the whole generation system will 
prove more reliable. 
In a liberalised market, the issue of remaining capacities over 
the peak load is of a different nature compared with the 
situation prevailing in a regulated market. The market has to 
provide the right pricing signal and incentives for operators 
in order to keep an adequate level of spare capacities and not 
endanger energy security.
So far, in the EU, generation capacity has also kept pace with 
peak demand (For UCTE countries, see figure 31). Large-
scale blackouts which occurred in the past did not result 
from a lack of generation capacities. This general situation 
is confirmed in particular by ETSO (25).
However, the possible peak demand in EU-27 over the period 
2005-2020 is projected to increase steadily, resulting in a need 
for new capacities (see figure 32).
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Source: UCTE
FIGURE 32
POSSIBLE EVOLUTION OF PEAK DEMAND AND CAPACITY TO MEET PEAK DEMAND IN EU27
2005 2010 2020
Peak demand capacity (GW) 508 543 622
Total demand (TWh) 3 100 3 325 3 800
Source: Eurelectric (EURPROG 2007)
(21, 22, 23)  ETSO – Generation adequacy – An assessment of the interconnected European power systems 2008-2015 – Update to year 2007.
(24)  It should be noted that intermittent renewable energy capacity cannot and is not counted as fully available for evaluating the reserve margin. 
  For example, only a fraction of wind capacity is considered to contribute to total capacity for determining the reserve capacity.
(25)  ETSO – Generation adequacy – An assessment of the interconnected European power systems 2008-2015 – Update to year 2007.
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The reliability of the EU’s generation capacity will also 
be strengthened by a more diverse generation mix. 
Diversity may be a business and a policy aim at the same 
time since it avoids risk exposure, provides flexibility to 
accommodate variations in demand and helps to reduce 
too heavy dependency on one type of fuel and/or on one 
technology. Diversity may thus foster reliability and greater 
independence. It is crucial for energy security and should 
be considered when assessing the adequacy of power 
generation infrastructure in the EU.
Diversity is a multifaceted concept. It could be characterised 
as an energy mix between fuels and technologies which 
is subject to appropriate switching capacities, providing 
an additional buffer against shocks and helping to curb 
potential risks.
FIGURE 33
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EU27 ELECTRICITY GENERATION CAPACITY BY TECHNOLOGY 2006
Note: Total generation capacity amounted to 762 GW in 2006
Source: Eurostat
FIGURE 34
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EU27 ELECTRICITY GENERATION CAPACITY BY ENERGY SOURCE 2007
Note: Total generation capacity amounted to 855 GW in 2007, which includes operating and cold standby capacities
Source: Platts 
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Currently, the EU’s generation mix is diversified (see figures 33, 
34, 35). About 30 % of power production is from nuclear and 
another 30 % results from solid fuel power plants. Natural gas 
and renewables are the fuels used for the remainder of the 
EU’s electricity production while the role of oil for electricity 
generation is now very limited. Compared to 1990, coal and 
oil have dropped respectively from 40 % to about 30 % and 
from 8 % to 4 %. Natural gas has been the major substitute for 
coal and oil. The current EU energy mix shows an increasing 
dependency on natural gas. Renewables have made their 
way into electricity production while undergoing at the same 
time a structural modification with an increase of wind and 
biomass and a relative decrease of hydro (see figure 27). 
With a view to energy security and to balancing supply 
and demand in particular in the case of peak of demand, 
the generation mix needs to offer generation flexibility 
between technologies. This also makes sense from an 
economic point of view since the generation costs vary 
according to technologies and load profiles.
As for secondary fuel in operating power plants, it appears 
that oil is predominant and represents a relatively constant 
share of the existing switching capacities (see figures 36, 37).
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Massive investments in new, low-carbon generation 
capacities are needed to supply the electricity Europe 
will need in the future. These investments will deliver 
the expected results only if they are not hampered 
and/or delayed.
4.2.1.  The potential for new, low-carbon 
power generation investments 
Under the New Energy Policy scenario, the capacity expansion 
necessary to meet the future power demand and to replace 
ageing facilities amounts to circa 360-390 GW over the 
period 2005-2020 depending on oil prices. This corresponds 
to around half of the currently installed capacity. With the 
Baseline, the capacity expansion needed amounts to circa 
370-415 GW depending on oil prices.
Compared to the past, the current investment needs are 
quite specific. There is a need for integrated investment 
decisions to make sure that the challenges of energy security 
and climate change are properly met. According to the New 
Energy Policy case, power generation based on gas and 
renewables would account for about 300-315 GW of the 
required capacity expansion, depending on oil prices. 
With the Baseline, this would amount to 265-290 GW, 
depending also on oil prices (see figures 39, 41).
FIGURE 38
POWER CAPACITY (in GW) – New Energy Policy and Baseline scenarios
2005
New Energy Policy
2020
Baseline scenario 
2020
Oil price 61$/bbl 100$/bbl 61$/bbl 100$/bbl
Total  740 891 (+20 %) 919 (+24 %) 901(+22 %) 946 (+28 %)
Solids 189 149 (-21 %) 158 (-16 %) 186 (-1.5 %) 203 (+7.5 %)
Oil 67 34 (-49 %) 36 (-47 %) 38 (-43 %) 38 (-43 %)
Nuclear 134 113 (-16 %) 115 (-14 %) 113 (-15 %) 116 (-13 %)
Gas 181 228 (+26 %) 233 (+28 %) 282 (+55 %) 273 (+51 %)
RES 168 366 (+118 %) 378 (+125 %) 282 (+67 %) 316 (+88 %)
Source: PRIMES
FIGURE 39
CAPACITY EXPANSION (in GW) – New Energy Policy scenario
2006-10 2011-15 2016-20 2005-2020
Oil price 61$/bbl 100$/bbl 61$/bbl 100$/bbl 61$/bbl 100$/bbl 61$/bbl 100$/bbl
Total 131.4 134.9 112.6 120.5 113.6 133.2 357.6 388.6
Solids 8.5 8.9 33.1 35.7 6.1 14.2 47.7 58.8
Oil 2.9 3.5 1.8 2.4 0.9 1.1 5.5 7.0
Nuclear 0.7 0.7 3.9 3.9 2.8 5.1 7.4 9.7
Gas 60.5 60.3 16 16 13.1 17.4 89.5 93.8
RES 58 61.5 57.9 62.4 90.7 95.5 207.5 219.4
Source: PRIMES
4.2.  The future of power generation capacity in Europe 
MOE_maquette_EN_081223.indd   Sec1:39 23/12/08   11:06:5740
FIGURE 41
CAPACITY EXPANSION (in GW) – Baseline scenario
2006-10 2011-15 2016-20 2005-2020
61$/bbl 100$/bbl 61$/bbl 100$/bbl 61$/bbl 100$/bbl 61$/bbl 100$/bbl
Total 130.9 137.1 114.3 128.9 123.6 151.1 368.8 417.1
Solids 12.3 14.5 39.1 46 33.6 45 150.9 105.5
Oil 5.5 4.5 3.0 3.6 1.1 1.2 9.6 9.3
Nuclear 0.7 0.7 3.8 3.9 2.9 6.1 7.4 10.7
Gas 69.5 70.8 37.1 35.6 36.7 28.2 143.3 205.4
RES 42.9 46.7 31.3 39.8 49.2 70.6 123.4 157.1
Source: PRIMES
On the basis of these forecasted capacity needs 
(370-415 GW) investments are expected to cost around 
€375-445 billion. Over time, investment needs may 
accumulate in the following way (see figure 42).
Power generation investments have to be decided well 
in advance to produce the desired effect. Investments 
are generally made for the long term and there is a risk of 
delay. In addition to the classical reasons for delay such as 
those related to authorisation procedures, investors may be 
confronted with bottlenecks for new technologies, increasing 
steel prices, and a lack of available engineering skills. 
Provided the investments which are currently planned 
by the operators are confirmed and properly carried out, 
it can be estimated that future demand will be satisfied 
(see figure 43). Nevertheless, experience shows that only 
a small proportion of investments planned or announced are 
carried out eventually. Investments in electricity supply are 
indeed very complex: they are highly capital-intensive with 
long lead-times both for building and for commissioning 
(i.e. bringing new capacities on stream). Their time horizon 
for profitability depends strongly on various external 
elements and conditions, which renders decision-making 
difficult for economic operators. Despite these difficulties, 
investments needed to meet the demand have been made 
so far. In the current context, volatile prices for some fuels 
may make investors reconsider or adjust investment projects.
FIGURE 42
OVERALL INVESTMENTS NEEDS EU27  Baseline scenario
 2006-10 2011-15 2016-20
(billion € 
2005)
(61$/bbl) 127.8 116 130.9
(100$/bbl) 135.2 136.5 176.1
Source: PRIMES
FIGURE 40
OVERALL INVESTMENT NEEDS  EU 27  New Energy Policy scenario 
 2006-10 2011-15 2016-20
Investment 
needs
(billion € 2005)
(61$/bbl) 131.0 131.4 134.9
(100$/bbl) 137.0 139.6 161.5
Source: PRIMES
On the basis of these forecasted capacity needs 
(360-390 GW) investments are expected to cost around 
€400-435 billion. Over time, investment needs may 
accumulate in the following way (see figure 40):
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FIGURE 43 (26)
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Recent investments have mainly focused on gas-fired 
generation and to a lesser extent on wind power and CHP. 
This evolution has enhanced the generation mix and 
reduced GHG emissions. It has nevertheless also increased 
the dependency on gas suppliers from third countries 
(see figure 34). A greater share of renewable energy will 
therefore not only further reduce GHG emissions from the 
power sector but will also foster diversity of the energy 
mix and lessen the import dependency on gas. In the 
New Energy Policy scenario, there are few investments 
in gas-fired generation after 2010.
In that context, all other options ensuring at the same time 
cost-effective, reliable and low-carbon power generation 
have to be explored. Nuclear power constitutes an option 
if a Member State so wishes, provided that safety requirements 
and waste treatment are properly addressed. Co-generation 
could also help to meet peak demand locally to a certain 
extent. Use of CHP technologies in public utilities and private 
households for example would release pressure on the con-
ventional power generation infrastructure and would limit 
dependence on centralised generation units. Obviously, the 
flexibility required may also be provided by a varied set of 
measures on the demand side. Smart metering and demand-
response programmes offering variation in electricity tariffs 
during peak hours could help with shaving peak demand 
and thus consolidate the reliability of the power generation 
infrastructure. Evidence suggests that peak demand can be 
shaved by demand-side measures by up to 5 %.
(26)  These figures are based on information collected from industry.
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FIGURE 46
CONSTRUCTION TIME
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Source: OECD/IEA, 2006
The planned investments demonstrate a further move 
towards diversification by fuels used but also by size with 
a tendency to build smaller, decentralised units, 
which would strengthen the reliability of the EU’s power 
generation capacity (27) (see figure 45).
4.2.2.  A shared responsibility for Europe’s future 
generation capacities
Private investors have made the necessary investments 
and no lack of generation capacities has been observed 
so far. However, planned investments will be of value in 
meeting the EU challenges only if implemented rapidly 
and vigorously. With this in mind, public authorities should 
facilitate investments and the implementation of investors’ 
strategies contributing to the EU’s energy security. At the EU 
level, the decisions that have been made and the political 
stance that has been taken are such that the legal framework 
may be considered stable and predictable with the adoption 
of the third internal market package as well as the ETS 
and RES framework as of 2009. 
In the current context, the public authorities’ contribution 
to the implementation of the necessary investments 
must focus on the planning and authorisation phases of 
investment projects. Planning difficulties are often the cause 
of delays and may negatively affect projects. Difficulties in 
obtaining authorisation to build new plants may result in 
delays that extend the average construction times even 
further (see figure 46) or, in the worst case, frustrate projects 
to such an extent that they are abandoned.
(27)  Leaving aside the challenges for the grid and its management.
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Annex 1
Description of the PRIMES model
Main assumptions of the 2007 baseline scenario 
and of the policy case (New Energy Policy)
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PRIMES is a general-purpose energy model that provides 
projections for the medium and long term, starting from 
2010 and running up to 2030 with results for every fifth 
year. PRIMES is not a tool for making short-term forecasts. 
The model can simulate the effects of changes in 
assumptions (e.g. on policies) or in a normative way 
(e.g. satisfying emission restrictions).
The PRIMES energy system model is a partial market 
equilibrium model that combines clearing of energy 
markets via price adjustments with a detailed technico-
economic representation of the energy system found 
in the EU. 
The model was developed by and is maintained at the 
National Technical University of Athens, E3M-Laboratory. 
Following on from the first version of the PRIMES model 
developed in 1995 with funding from the European 
Commission, the model has been continuously improved 
and extended. The current version (4) of the model covers 
each EU-27 Member State individually, EU candidate 
countries and neighbours such as Norway, Switzerland 
and Turkey. Its geographic scope is being extended 
to the countries of South-East Europe.
The energy baseline scenarios of 1999, 2003, 2005 and 2007 
and various scenarios on issues such as energy efficiency, 
renewables, nuclear and climate change derive from PRIMES. 
The Commission departments concerned used PRIMES for 
the energy and climate package of January 2008. 
Main features
PRIMES simulates a market equilibrium solution for energy 
supply and demand. The equilibrium is determined by prices 
for each energy form such that the quantity considered 
optimum by producers matches the quantity consumers 
wish to use. The equilibrium is static (within each time 
period) but repeated in a time-forward path, under dynamic 
relationships.
PRIMES is organised in a modular way representing fuel 
supply, energy conversion and end-use of demand sectors 
(see figure A1.1). With this modularity, each sector is represented 
and any single sector or group of sectors can be run indepen-
dently for stand-alone analysis. The different modules interact 
via the exchange of fuel quantities and prices.
1.  The PRIMES energy system model: 
  design and features
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FIGURE A1.1
PRIMES MODULAR STRUCTURE
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The model is organised by energy supply sub-system: oil 
products, natural gas, coal, renewables, electricity and steam 
production, including conversion, and by end-use sectors 
for demand (twelve industrial sectors, transport, residential, 
services and agriculture). Some end-use sectors may also be 
suppliers, for example industrial co-generators of electricity 
and steam. 
The model is behavioural. It also represents the available 
energy demand and supply technologies and pollution 
abatement technologies. The system reflects considerations 
about market economics, industry structure, energy/
environmental policies and regulation. These considerations 
are conceived so as to influence market behaviour of energy 
system agents.
BOX A1.1
PRIMES energy sector coverage
For each EU-27 Member State, EU candidate country and neighbouring country, the PRIMES energy system covers 
(see figure A1.1):
12 industrial sectors:
  subdivided into 26 sub-sectors; 
  using energy in 12 generic processes (air compression, furnaces, electric arc, etc.);
4 transport modes, 9 transport means and 10 vehicle technologies;
5 dwelling types (residential sector) using:
  energy in 5 processes (e.g. space heating, cooking, water heating and air conditioning);
12 types of electrical durable goods (refrigerators, washing machines, television sets, etc.);
3 services sectors using energy in 6 generic processes (air conditioning, office equipment, lighting, etc.);
agriculture sector using energy in 5 generic processes (greenhouses, pumping, etc.);
14 types of fossil fuels, 10 types of renewable energy (hydro, wind, solar, etc.) and energy carriers such as
hydrogen and methanol.
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The modular structure of PRIMES reflects a distribution 
of decision-making among agents. These agents decide 
individually about their supply, demand, combined supply 
and demand, and prices. The market-integrating part of 
PRIMES simulates market clearing.
PRIMES assumes that producers and consumers both respond 
to changes in prices. The factors determining the demand 
for and the supply of each fuel are represented, so they 
form the demand and/or supply behaviour of the agents. 
Through an iterative process, the model determines the 
economic equilibrium for each fuel market. Price-driven 
equilibrium is considered in all energy and environment 
markets, including Europe-wide clearing of oil and gas 
markets. The modelling framework takes into account 
networks such as the Europe-wide power grid and natural 
gas network, and interconnections with third countries 
on electricity and gas. 
PRIMES also simulates the technology choice in energy 
demand and energy production. The model explicitly considers 
the existing stock of equipment, its normal decommissioning 
and the possibility of premature replacement. 
The model covers all technologies relevant to the energy 
system, including the possible use of carbon capture and 
storage. Many details on a great number of technologies 
such as investment costs, efficiencies, load factors, operation 
and maintenance costs are included. Power plant investments 
are thus determined endogenously on the basis of long-run 
marginal costs. Cost parameters change over time reflecting 
technical progress.
The model estimates all prices of energy commodities in 
an explicit way. Pricing is assumed to follow a Ramsey- 
Boiteux equilibrium with possible mark-ups on total costs 
reflecting market competition regimes. Price determination 
reflects recovery of total costs including stranded investment, 
if applicable. Several options are available for price-related 
policy instruments, such as emission trading schemes, 
renewables trading schemes, simulation of feed-in tariffs, 
taxes and subsidies.
The model computes CO2 emissions from energy. It is 
further linked with IIASA’s GAINS model to estimate other 
environmental emissions (including SOx, NOx, PM, VOC 
and all non CO2 greenhouse gases).
PRIMES has around 180 000 equations and endogenous 
variables per Member State and time period for the core 
model. The input data base includes around 220 000 time 
series per Member State. PRIMES is comparable in scope 
and complexity with the ‘National energy modelling system’ 
(NEMS) used by the US government.
BOX A1.3
Power generation and steam/heat in PRIMES
PRIMES is particularly detailed on power generation and steam/heat. For simulating investment decisions the 
model chooses from among more than 150 power generation technologies with different technical and cost 
characteristics. The choice depends on cost, demand levels and load curve characteristics also in relation to the 
simultaneous provision of electricity and heat. The potentials for each fuel and energy use, as well as for the 
development of new sites for large-scale power plants and also for nuclear and wind, are represented through 
non-linear cost-supply curves for each country. 
Power generation, heat/steam supply by CHP and by boilers or district heating are simulated simultaneously in order 
to analyse possible substitutions and synergies, as for example cogeneration (CHP). A distinction is made between 
large-scale utilities and smaller-scale industrial cogeneration. The model represents the seasonal and daily patterns 
of electricity load and heat/steam load, which are taken into account in simulations. The gas supply model also 
considers time variability of gas load but assumes daily balancing.
The power generation sub-model of PRIMES represents the transmission network across Europe and performs 
a DC-linear power flow simulation, taking into account cross-border restrictions (e.g. lack of interconnectors). 
The model can solve either an EU-wide power market equilibrium (in which power trade flows among countries 
are a result of the model) or a country-by-country power market equilibrium.
BOX A1.2
Set of policies represented in PRIMES:
  taxes, subsidies, tradable permits or certificates;
  technology supporting policies;
  environmental policy instruments;
  market interventions and regulations.
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FIGURE A1.2
PRICE OF FOSSIL FUELS
$’2005/boe 2005 2010 2015 2020
61$/bbl 100$/bbl 61$/bbl 100$/bbl 61$/bbl 100$/bbl 
Oil 54.5 54.5 69.7 57.9 83.3 61.1 100.1
Gas 34.6 41.5 46.3 43.4 61.4 46 77.5
Coal 14.8 13.7 15.8 14.3 20.3 14.7 24.2
Note: boe stands for barrel of oil equivalent (roughly 7.2 boe = 1 toe). The dollar exchange rate is assumed to equal 1.25 $/€. 
The Baseline scenario for the EU and each of its 27 Member 
States reflects energy policies implemented until the end of 
2006 as a starting point for projections which are presented 
from 2010 onwards in 5-year steps until 2030.
The 2007 Baseline scenario takes into account the high 
energy import price environment of recent years, 
sustained economic growth and new policies and 
measures implemented in the Member States. 
The Baseline scenario does not assume that (indicative) 
targets as set out in existing Directives, such as share of 
renewables, will necessarily be met. The numerical values for 
these policy indicators are outcomes of the modelling and 
reflect implemented policies rather than targets. This also 
applies for CO2 emissions that are not constrained by Kyoto 
targets in the Baseline scenario. 
The Baseline scenario is a reference development for 
scenarios on alternative policy approaches or framework 
conditions (e.g. higher energy import prices), in addition 
to its role as a trend projection.
The Policy case examines the implementation of the energy 
policy targets on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and 
renewables (RES), in line with the proposals made by the 
Commission in January 2008. It also includes considerable 
action on energy efficiency by taking into account the 
vigorous implementation of existing Directives on e.g. 
building performance, CHP, end-use energy efficiency 
and energy services, eco-design in the Member States, 
as well as further efficiency policies along the lines of the 
Action Plan for Energy Efficiency. 
The energy consequences of adopted or proposed new 
energy and climate policies are explored. From the security 
of supply perspective, it focuses on EU-27 energy demand, 
domestic production and imports to 2030. It determines 
overall policy effects by comparison with the baseline that 
depicts the energy/CO2 situation without these policies. 
2.   The baseline and the policy case 
(New Energy Policy) scenarios: main assumptions
2.1. Common  assumptions 
The 2007 updates of the energy Baseline scenario and the 
Policy case (2008) are based on a set of common assumptions.
  Demographic assumptions
  Projections for EU-27, taken from EUROSTAT forecasts, 
reflect a slightly increasing population up to 2020 with 
  no further increase thereafter. 
  The average household size in the EU-27 is expected to 
decline from 2.4 persons in 2005 to 2.1 persons in 2030 
(UN projections and information from the Member States).
  Macroeconomic assumptions
  The projections on economic growth (2.2 % on average 
  up to 2020) are in line with DG ECFIN’s short and long-
term expectations.
  The macroeconomic scenario reflects changes in 
  the structure of the EU economy. Sectors with higher 
value added develop more rapidly than energy and 
material intensive sectors. However, the pace of change 
  is expected to decelerate in the long run.
  Energy import price assumptions
  The price assumptions for the EU-27 result from world 
energy modelling. Price trajectories for oil, gas and coal 
are derived from a conventional wisdom view of the 
development of the world energy system. Two price 
environments have been used: a moderate and a high 
oil price environment. 
Fossil fuel prices develop as follows:
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The oil prices in real terms translate into a nominal price 
of 84 $/barrel in 2020 (moderate prices environment) and 
138 $/barrel in 2020 (high oil prices) provided that the ECB 
can keep inflation below 2 % per year (their target), which 
is currently not realised (latest projection for 2008: 3.6 %). 
  Energy taxation assumptions
  Tax rates are kept constant in real terms at their 2006 
levels unless otherwise provided for in the Energy Taxation 
Directive. In some Member States, the EU minimum rates 
will apply at the end of transition periods. During these 
periods, the Member States concerned are authorised 
to apply lower rates. 
 Degree  days 
  The degree days, reflecting climate conditions, are kept 
constant at the 2000 level. This is higher than the long-
term average (some warming has already happened) 
without assuming that this trend will continue (the extent 
of which would be very uncertain). The degree days in 
2000 were fairly similar to the ones in 2005. This allows 
comparison of recent statistics with the projection 
numbers, without entailing the need for climate correction.
  Technical-economic parameters
  PRIMES includes all relevant technologies for the 
energy system, including the possible use of carbon 
capture and storage, and many details on a great number 
of technologies such as investment costs, efficiencies, 
load factors, operation and maintenance costs. 
As a result power plant investments can be determined 
endogenously on the basis of long-run marginal costs. 
Cost parameters change over time reflecting technical 
progress. 
  The technical-economic characteristics of existing and 
new energy technologies used in the demand and 
the supply sectors of the energy system evolve over time 
and improve according to exogenously specified trends. 
According to the Baseline logic, consumers and suppliers 
are generally hesitant to adopt new technologies before 
they become sufficiently mature. They behave as if they 
perceive a high cost (or a high subjective discount rate) 
when deciding upon adoption of new technologies. 
 
  Public policies, through campaigns, industrial policy, 
R&D support and other means, aim at pushing more rapid 
adoption of new technologies by removing uncertainties 
associated with their use. In this way, the technologies 
themselves reach maturity more rapidly as a result of 
‘learning-by-doing’ effects and economies of scale. 
In the Baseline scenario, policies to promote clean and 
efficient technologies continue focussing on support 
schemes for renewables following past trends.
  Discount rates
  Discount rates differ according to the type of economic actor. 
 
  In the case of power generation, discount rates may vary 
over time to reflect increasing competition. Decision-
making on power plant investment is simulated by 
applying a cost of capital rate (similar to a discount rate), 
which also includes a risk premium; this rate ranges from 
8.2 % to 10.5 % according to the time period and the size 
of the typical generating company. 
 
  In industry, services and agriculture the discount rate 
amounts to 12 % for the whole projection period. 
Households have an even higher discount rate of 17.5 %. 
For transport, private passenger transport investments 
(e.g. for cars) are based on a discount rate of 17.5 %, 
while for trucks and inland navigation the rate is 12 %. 
The assumed discount rate for public transport energy 
investment is 8 %, reflecting the acceptance of longer 
pay-back periods than those required in industry or 
private households. 
  All these rates are in real terms, i.e. after deducting inflation.
2.2. Specific  assumptions
2.2.1.  Baseline (2007) – main assumptions
The 2007 Baseline scenario includes policies and measures 
implemented in the Member States up to the end of 2006. 
This concerns in particular ongoing policies on:
  completion of the internal energy market by 2010, taking 
into account derogations for electricity and gas market 
opening as regards e.g. isolated gas markets or recent 
introduction of natural gas;
  energy efficiency (implementation of the building, 
CHP, labelling Directives, etc; national policies on 
education, information, public procurement, CHP, etc). 
The assumption that the CO2 agreement with the car 
industry (essentially fuel efficiency) for 2008/09 would 
be honoured had to be dropped but there is still 
considerable improvement assumed;
  renewables (e.g. implementation of measures under 
the electricity and biofuels Directives, ongoing national 
policies supporting RES deployment);
  nuclear (nuclear phase-out as agreed in certain Member 
States, closure of existing plants in recently acceded 
Member States according to agreed schedules; nuclear 
investment is possible in countries that have not ruled 
out nuclear or see such investment as unlikely for 
the medium term); 
  promotion of clean and efficient technology; 
  climate change (continuation of the EU ETS over 
the projection period without extension to new sectors).
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The CO2 prices in the ETS sector increase from 20€ (2005)/t CO2 
in 2010 to 22€/t CO2 in 2020. They reflect current levels and 
preserve the baseline approach of a continuation of current 
policies – but taking into account that CDM/JI credits may 
become more expensive over time. 
2.2.2.  Policy case – main assumptions
The main assumptions of the Policy case refer to Greenhouse 
Gas emissions and RES targets, energy efficiency and energy 
import prices.
2.2.2.1.  GHG emissions target
The Policy case scenario is consistent with the EU’s target on 
the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by at least 20 % 
in 2020 compared to the 1990 levels (unilateral commitment 
by the EU). This scenario achieves the GHG reduction with 
energy policy measures alone without use of JI/CDM credits 
and action on other gases than energy related CO2 emissions. 
While achieving this way a 20 % cut in energy-related CO2 
emissions, this scenario shows that the EU could do better 
than the unilateral 20 % GHG reduction commitment. This 
scenario is, therefore, compatible with the possible case of 
successful international climate negotiations, in which the EU 
would accept a target up to minus 30 % for GHG including 
action in respect of non-energy-related CO2 and non-CO2 
gases as well as recourse to JI/CDM credits. The Policy 
case scenario showing a greater contribution from energy 
efficiency following the 20 % savings objective endorsed 
by the European Council of March 2007 is, also, more 
strict than the one actually proposed by the Commission 
in the Package of Implementation measures for the EU’s 
objectives on climate change and renewable energy for 2020 
(SEC(2008)85/3).
For ETS including aviation, full auctioning is assumed only 
for the power generation sector. The other sectors subject 
to ETS continue to receive allowances without auctioning. 
However, allowances have a much higher price than under 
baseline conditions as a result of greater scarcity following 
the proposed ETS Directive. Moreover, the Policy case 
excludes action outside the EU via JI/CDM (similar to 
the cost-efficient reference case of the joint RES/climate 
policy Impact Assessment for the January 2008 package). 
The CO2 price required to achieve the ETS cap of the January 
2008 proposal, generated by the PRIMES model, is €41 per 
ton of CO2 in 2020. 
The policy instruments employed to achieve the GHG 
reduction target are directly linked with those for the RES 
target. EU ETS will facilitate growth in renewable energy; 
the renewable energy Directive will create conditions enabling 
renewable energy to play a key role in reaching the GHG 
reduction target. Therefore, the carbon price required under 
the energy policy case assumption is lower than in the case 
where no renewables policies are put in place. 
2.2.2.2. RES  target
The Policy case includes the achievement of a 20 % share 
of renewable energy sources in final energy consumption 
at EU level by 2020. The RES target is achieved cost-efficiently 
through equal RES incentive/support across Member States. 
This is compatible with country-specific targets and full trade 
in guarantees of origin for renewables, which ensures 
the cost-effective achievement of the EU target (28). 
The RES incentive to achieve the 20 % target amounts to 
43 €/MWh in 2020. Similarly to the carbon price, the level 
of incentive for reaching a given RES target is lower with 
the simultaneous pursuit of GHG policies as a carbon price 
favours the deployment of RES. 
In the Policy scenario, the 10 % target for biofuels is achieved 
at EU-27 level by 2020, with free trade being allowed 
between the Member States. In addition, some imports 
of biomass/biofuels from third countries are envisaged.
This scenario assumes that GHG and RES policies continue 
over time without modelling major new initiatives that have 
not yet been defined in the policy process.
2.2.2.3. Energy  efficiency
The Policy scenario assumes vigorous implementation 
of existing Directives on e.g. building performance, CHP, 
end-use energy efficiency and energy services, eco-design 
in the Member States as well as further efficiency policies 
along the lines of the Action Plan for Energy Efficiency. 
The same scenario shows energy savings of 13 % compared 
with the baseline, i.e. energy intensity declines by 13 % in 
terms of primary energy consumption in 2020. This follows 
from the assumption that a 20 % greenhouse gas reduction 
in 2020 compared to 1990 is reached with energy policy 
measures in the EU alone under the conditions of the 
proposals made by the Commission in January 2008 
on ETS and RES. 
However, the need to implement vigorously the Energy 
Efficiency Action Plan at national and Community level 
remains. This Action Plan offers a safety margin if the 
implementation of one or the other measure were to 
achieve less than envisaged. It would also help the EU 
to reach more ambitious greenhouse gas targets 
(e.g. minus 30 % instead of 20 %) as a possible result 
of international climate negotiations.
 
Reversing long-standing increasing trends, the primary 
energy consumption decreases by 5.6 % in 2020 compared 
to 2005.
(28)  This approach keeps the modelling robust vis-à-vis any change of national RES targets that may be made in the process of Council negotiations.
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Annex 2
Overview of the results of the 2007 baseline scenario 
and of the policy case (New Energy Policy)
Source: PRIMES
MOE_maquette_EN_081223.indd   Sec1:51 23/12/08   11:06:5852
FIGURE A2.1
PRIMARY ENERGY DEMAND, EU PRIMARY PRODUCTION AND NET IMPORTS Mtoe 
IN 2020 FOR EU27 
2005 Baseline scenario New Energy Policy scenario
Oil price 61$/bbl 100$/bbl  61$/bbl  100$/bbl 
Primary energy demand (Mtoe)  1 811 1 968 1 903 1 712 1 672
Oil 666 702 648 608 567
Natural gas 445 505 443 399 345
Solids 320 342 340 216 253
Renewables 123 197 221 270 274
Nuclear 257 221 249 218 233
EU primary production (Mtoe)  896 725 774 733 763
Oil 133 53 53 53 52
Natural gas 188 115 113 107 100
Solids 196 142 146 108 129
Renewables 122 193 213 247 250
Nuclear 257 221 249 218 233
Net imports (Mtoe)  975 1 301 1 184 1 033 962
Oil 590 707 651 610 569
Natural gas 257 390 330 291 245
Solids 127 200 194 108 124
Renewables 1 3 8 23 24
Import dependence (%) 52.1 64.2 60.5 58.5 55.8
Oil 81.6 93.0 92.5 92.0 91.6
Natural gas 57.7 77.2 74.6 73.1 71.1
Solids 39.2 58.5 57.0 50.0 49.0
Energy intensity (% change 
compared to Baseline scenario, 
oil price 61$/bbl)
-3.3 -13.0 -15.0
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FIGURE A2.2
FINAL ENERGY DEMAND Mtoe, GROSS ELECTRICITY GENERATION TWh 
AND EMISSIONS INDEX IN 2020 FOR EU27 
2005 Baseline scenario New Energy Policy scenario
Oil price 61$/bbl 100$/bbl  61$/bbl  100$/bbl 
Final energy demand by sector 
(Mtoe)
1 167 1 348 1 293 1 185 1 140
Industry 324 368 357 354 339
Residential 307 336 320 281 272
Tertiary 174 205 194 160 154
Transport 362 439 423 390 375
Final energy demand by fuel 
(Mtoe)
1 167 1 348 1 293 1 185 1 140
Oil 493 540 499 465 433
Gas 287 314 287 255 235
Solids 53 55 56 50 50
Electricity 238 303 302 257 260
Heat 
(from CHP and district heating)
41 46 44 41 41
Other 55 89 105 117 121
Gross electricity generation 
by fuel type (in TWh)
3 275 4 078 4 065 3 443 3 493
Nuclear energy 998 866 977 851 911
Renewables 488 824 887 1 086 1 094
Fossil fuels 1 790 2 389 2 201 1 506 1 489
Emissions index (1990=100)
Total GHGs emissions 93.4 98.5 92.9 80.0 78.0
CO2 emissions (energy related) 97.5 105.1 97.7 79.8 77.5
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FIGURE A2.3
NET INSTALLED POWER CAPACITY IN 2020 GW AND 
INVESTMENTS IN POWER GENERATION BETWEEN 20052020 FOR EU27
2005 Baseline scenario New Energy Policy scenario
Oil price 61$/bbl 100$/bbl  61$/bbl  100$/bbl 
Net installed power capacity (GW) 740 901 946 891 919
Oil fired 67 38 38 34 36
Gas fired 181 282 273 228 233
Solids fired 189 186 203 149 158
Renewable energy 168 282 316 366 378
Nuclear energy 134 113 116 113 115
Net power capacity investment 
during 2008-2020 (GW)
369 417 358 389
Oil fired 10 9 5 7
Gas fired 143 135 90 94
Solids fired 85 105 48 59
Renewable energy 123 157 207 219
Nuclear energy 7 11 7 10
Investment in power generation 
including CHP between 2005-2020 
(billion € 2005)
375 448 397 438
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Annex 3
Europe’s current energy position – EU-27 statistics (29)
(29)   Detailed statistics per Member State can be found in the Statistical Annex to Europe’s current and future energy position at the following website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/strategies/2008/2008_11_ser2_en.htm
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Annotations
Total primary energy supply – shows the share of energy 
sources in the energy mix. It is the quantity of energy 
consumed within the borders of a country. It is calculated 
using the formula: primary production + recovered 
products + imports + stock changes - exports - bunkers 
(i.e. quantities supplied to sea-going ships).
Total final consumption – (Mtoe) – is the energy 
finally consumed in the transport, industrial, commercial, 
agricultural, public and household sectors. It excludes 
deliveries to the energy conversion sector and to the 
energy industries themselves.
Electricity mix – shows the share of the various energy 
sources used for electricity generation. 
Electricity generation – (TWh) – is the quantity of electricity 
produced within the borders of a country. 
Indigenous production – shows the share of energy 
sources extracted and used from domestic natural sources. 
The precise definition depends on the fuel involved. 
Coal – quantities of fuels extracted or produced, calculated 
after any operation to remove inert matter. In general, 
production includes the quantities consumed by the 
producer during the production process (e.g. for heating 
or operation of equipment and auxiliaries) plus any quantities 
supplied to other on-site producers of energy for conversion 
or other uses.
Crude oil – quantities of fuels extracted or produced 
within national boundaries, including offshore production. 
Production includes only marketable production and 
excludes any quantities returned to formation. Production 
includes all crude oil, natural gas liquids (NGL), condensates 
and oil from shale and tar sands, etc.
Natural gas – quantities of dry gas, measured after 
purification and extraction of natural gas liquids and 
sulphur. Production includes only marketable production, 
and excludes any quantities re-injected, vented and flared, 
and any extraction losses. Production includes all quantities 
used within the natural gas industry, in gas extraction, 
pipeline systems and processing plants. 
Nuclear – quantities of heat produced in a reactor. 
Production is the actual heat produced or the heat 
calculated on the basis of the gross electricity generated 
and the thermal efficiency of the nuclear plant. All nuclear 
production is set as fully indigenous.
Geothermal – quantities of heat extracted from geothermal 
fluids. Production is calculated on the basis of the difference 
between the enthalpy of the fluid produced in the production 
borehole and that of the fluid disposed of via the re-injection 
borehole. 
Biomass/Waste – in the case of municipal solid wastes 
(MSW), wood, wood wastes and other solid wastes, production 
is the heat produced after combustion and corresponds to 
the heat content (NCV) of the fuel. In the case of anaerobic 
digestion of wet wastes, production is the heat content (NCV) 
of the biogases produced. Production includes all quantities 
of gas consumed in the installation for the fermentation 
processes, and excludes all quantities of flared gases. In the 
case of biofuels, production is the heat content (NCV) 
of the fuel. 
Hydro – electricity generated by hydro power plant includes 
small hydro. Tide, Wave, Ocean power plants are included as 
well, because Eurostat is using it in this way.
Wind – electricity generated by onshore and offshore wind 
power plants. Figures are set for the end of 2004, while there 
was a significant increase of new installed Wind Power Plants 
in 2005. 
Net imports by fuels – (Mtoe) – share of all energy sources 
imported, excluding all nuclear, which is set as indigenous 
by Eurostat. Net electricity imports are included.
Imports of crude oil – imported crude oil divided 
by countries of origin, EU-27 is counted without imports 
inside the EU.
Imports of natural gas – imported natural gas divided by 
countries of origin, EU-27 is counted without imports inside 
the EU.
Imports of hard coal – imported hard coal divided by 
countries of origin, EU-27 is counted without imports 
inside the EU.
Final energy intensity – is calculated as final energy 
demand divided by value added at basic prices. For some 
industrial sectors, like the iron and steel industry, the non-
ferrous metals industry and the engineering industry, 
it was not possible to calculate energy intensity values, 
as the value added at basic prices is not given for these 
definitions of sectors in the national accounts data from 
Eurostat. In contrast to primary energy intensity, final energy 
intensity does not consider the efficiency of the energy 
transformation sector.
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CO2 emissions per capita – are calculated as total CO2 
emissions divided by total population.
CO2 intensity – is calculated by dividing the total CO2 
emissions by the gross inland energy consumption. It is 
an indicator for the carbon intensity of the energy system. 
Import dependency – net imports of a country or region 
divided by the sum of the gross inland consumption and 
bunkers of that energy carrier. ‘All Fuels’ shows the import 
dependency for oil, gas, solid fuels, electricity and renewables 
in total. The aggregate ‘renewables’ considers all forms of 
renewable energy carriers, like electricity from wind or hydro 
power as well as biofuels and biomass in general. A negative 
import dependency has to be interpreted as net exports.
Industry – the sector is defined according to the following 
NACE codes: D (Manufacturing) + F (Construction) – 
DF (Manufacture of energy products).
Non-Metallic Mineral Products Industry – the sector 
is defined according to the NACE code DI ‘Manufacture 
of other non-metallic mineral products’, which includes 
for example the manufacture of cement, clinker and 
glass products.
Chemical Industry – the sector is defined according to NACE 
code DG ‘Manufacture of chemicals, chemical products and 
man-made fibres’.
Food, Drink and Tobacco Industry – the sector is defined 
according to NACE code DA ‘Manufacture of food products; 
beverages and tobacco’.
Paper and Printing Industry – the sector is defined 
according to NACE code DE ‘Manufacture of pulp, paper 
and paper products; publishing and printing’.
Services – the sector is defined according to the following 
NACE codes: G + H + J + K + L + M + N + O.
Transport – the sector covers all types of transport. 
To calculate energy intensity the final energy consumption 
in transport was divided by the value added at basic prices 
of the whole economy.
Sources – All data are 2006 data from Eurostat.
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325.23 Mtoe (18 %) % % Solid fuels
673.47 Mtoe (37 %) % % Oil
Renewables    129.15 Mtoe (7 %) % %
Nuclear             255.34 Mtoe (14 %) % %
Gas                     437.93 Mtoe (24 %) % %
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3.75 Mtoe (0 %)       Industrial waste
122.55 Mtoe (14 %) % % Oil
179.40 Mtoe (20 %) % % Gas
191.45 Mtoe (22 %) % % Solid fuels
Renewables    127.42 Mtoe (14 %) % %
Nuclear             255.34 Mtoe (30 %) % %
EU27, PRIMARY PRODUCTION AND RECOVERED PRODUCTS 2006
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2. ENERGY SUPPLY
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213.6 Mio tonnes (38 %) % % OPEC
Countries
Others               46.0 Mio tonnes (8 %) % %
Russia                189.0 Mio tonnes (33 %) % %
Kazahkhstan   26.8 Mio tonnes (5 %) % %
Norway             89.1 Mio tonnes (16 %) % %
EU27, IMPORTS OF CRUDE OIL 2006
4 927 552 TJ (42 %) % % Russia
Others               1 261 616 TJ (11 %) % %
Norway             2 844 269 TJ (24 %) % %
Nigeria              560 986 TJ (5 %) % %
Algeria              2 134 886 TJ (18 %) % %
EU27, IMPORTS OF NATURAL GAS 2006
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54 890 000 T (26 %) % % Russia
53 172 000 T (25 %) % % South Africa
Others               13 444 000 T (6 %) % %
Australia           27 258 000 T (13 %) % %
Colombia         26 052 000 T (12 %) % %
United States  17 265 000 T (8 %) % %
Indonesia         20 313 000 T (10 %) % %
EU27, IMPORTS OF HARD COAL 2006
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961.70 TWh (29 %) % % Solid fuels
706.65 TWh (21 %) % % Gas
131.09 TWh (4 %) % % Oil
Other 80.30 TWh (2 %) % %
Renewables    488.35 TWh (15 %) % %
Nuclear             989.88 TWh (29 %) % %
EU27, ELECTRICITY MIX 2006
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3. ELECTRICITY
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4. ENERGY INTENSITY
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5. CO2 EMISSIONS
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1 000T – Kilo tonnes
Bbl – Billion barrels
bbl – Blue barrel
Bcm – Billion cubic meters
BGR – Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe
boe – Barrels of oil equivalent
BP – British Petroleum plc
Bt – Billion tonnes
Cap – Capita
EEA – European Economic Area
EIA – Energy Information Agency
ETS – EU emissions trading scheme
GHG – Greenhouse gas
GW – Giga watts
IFP – Institut français du pétrole
IPCC – Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
JI/CDM - Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
Mbl – Million barrels
Meuro – Million Euro
Mt – Million tonnes
Mtoe – Million tonnes of oil equivalent
OGP – Oil and gas producers
OPEC – Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
RES – Renewables energy sources
Tcm – Trillion cubic meters
TJ – Tera joules
TWh – Terawatt hours
UCTE – Union for the Coordination of Transmission of Electricity
WEC – World Energy Council
Annex 4
Glossary – main abbreviations
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